Paul Cohen, the lead lawyer behind the Sulu arbitration claims, met in Manila with a number of regional intelligence experts after a notable absence from the final hearing in Paris. Image Source: Adobe Stock

This meeting occurred just weeks after the July 7th hearing in Europe that will likely end the USD 15 billion Sulu case against Malaysia brought in the names of Fuad Abdullah Kiram and seven other private Filipino citizens who claim descent from the defunct Sultanate of Sulu.

Paul Cohen, their lead counsel, was notably absent from that hearing, with his appearance in Manila alongside co-counsel Elisabeth Mason suggesting that attention may now be shifting from courtroom strategy to a surreptitious campaign focused in Southeast Asia.

Attention may now be shifting from courtroom strategy to a wider surreptitious campaign focused in Southeast Asia.

Indeed, they were joined by a number of individuals with strong links to the intelligence world: Charles George Webb, Matthew Ryan Williams, and former CIA officer Richard Jacobson.

A Cabal of Spies

Webb’s London‑based private intelligence consultancy, Hanuman, already has a documented presence as far as Singapore—where he once led Control Risks’ Asia presence in the ’90s. His simultaneous directorship of PR agency Sanzaru uniquely positions him for complex influence operations.

His past work at Penumbra Partners—a firm co-founded by his godfather, former MI6 officer Michael Oatley—also casts a long shadow, with a prior playbook of identifying local grievances, high stakes litigation, and the steering of public narratives to leverage governments. While there is no documented previous involvement of Webb with the Sulu case, the details of the dispute match with his experience in such a way that can only draw concern given his meeting with Fuad Kiram’s lawyers.

Webb worked with Penumbra Partners with previous playbook of identifying local grievances, high stakes litigation, and the steering of public narratives to leverage governments.

The clandestine group’s ties to intelligence operations deepen further with the presence of Matthew Ryan Williams, head of Chancery Advisors, an investigations and risk consultancy with a footprint in both Singapore and the Philippines. Williams brings long-standing experience in intelligence-style operations across Southeast Asia and is reportedly familiar with the Manila security landscape from earlier work connected to U.S. programs in the region.

He was joined by Richard Jacobson—a former CIA station chief previously based in Indonesia with a long-standing connection to Fuad Kiram—and Marc Singer, a close professional associate of Williams. Williams, Jacobson, and Singer had previously worked together at Pacific Strategies & Assessments, a Southeast Asia–focused consultancy.

Worst Case Scenarios with a Manipulated Public

This assembly of strategists trained on the playbooks of MI6 and the CIA points not to the conclusion of a legal battle that has visited the courtrooms of Spain, France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, but to the opening moves of a broader strategy likely designed to engage and manipulate public dynamics in the Philippines.

Manila has thus far distanced itself from what it declares a private affair between the Sulu claimants and Malaysia—not least after the status of North Borneo was settled by the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia in the 1960s.

Yet nationalist Filipino voices have sporadically echoed the Sulu claimants and even argued that Sabah is not an issue for the supposed heirs of a Sultanate once based in the southern Philippines, but a territory that the Manila itself should seek to possess. While such voices have thus far played only a fringe role in the Sabah dispute, they represent a frightening avenue to continue the issue once European courtrooms deliver their final dismissal.

Filipino nationalists represent a frightening avenue to continue the Sabah dispute once European courtrooms deliver their final dismissal.

The face of this operation—yet not the intelligence—remains Fuad Kiram, often self-styled as styled as Sri Paduka Maulana Al Sultan Muhammad Fuad Abdulla Kiram I. Kiram brings no relevant legal, commercial, or political authority, supplying little more than a surplus of claims and colonial histories designed to buttress his entitlements―many now documented on KnowSulu.ph.

While Fuad Kiram continues to struggle with the lack of official recognition for his claim to royal status—a claim disputed even within the Sulu family—the legal battle pursued in his name appears poised to expand far beyond his personal financial interest in extracting a $15 billion reward through claims to Sabah. As critics of arbitration and litigation finance have long warned, such cases risk becoming Trojan horses for broader financial and political agendas that extend well beyond the claimants themselves.

As critics have long warned, such cases risk becoming Trojan horses for broader financial and political agendas that extend well beyond the claimants themselves.

With legal avenues in Europe narrowing, a worst case scenario may be tried-and-proven yet distasteful intelligence methods: a pivot toward nationalistic rhetoric driven by targeted engagement with regional power brokers, curated academic narratives, and social media campaigns designed to stir cultural grievance and political urgency among Filipinos.

With sufficient pressure, Manila’s policymakers would be forced to respond, continuing a dispute on behalf of private actors—both domestic and European—with no financial or political benefit to the Philippine government or its people.

REFERENCES

KnowSulu.ph. (2025, July 25). Cohen, Mason, and the quiet arrival of Charles Webb: A power trio lands in Manila. https://knowsulu.ph/the-untold-sulu-story/