The province of Sulu has been assigned to Zamboanga Peninsula Region IX (left) after a Supreme Court ruling blocking its inclusion in BARMM (right). Image Source: WikiMedia

President Marcos signed Executive Order No. 91 on July 30, formalizing the administrative change. The move follows years of legal and political back-and-forth after Sulu opted out of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) through a 2019 plebiscite.

The BARMM was established as a product of a peace deal between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

Despite the 2019 plebiscite, the Commission on Elections initially included Sulu within BARMM, sparking legal action that culminated in the Supreme Court’s decision to honor the results of the local referendum.

Government officials emphasized the realignment to Region IX is intended to ensure the continuity of essential services and budget allocations in one of the Philippines’ most undeveloped regions, especially with BARMM's transitional mandate nearing its end in 2025.

Government officials emphasized the move to Region IX is intended to ensure the continuity of essential services in one of the Philippines’ most undeveloped regions.

BARMM leaders, while expressing disappointment, responded with a message of inclusion. "Our doors will never close to Sulu," BARMM Chief Minister Ahod Ebrahim said, urging continued cooperation and expressing hope for future unity. The BARMM government has reiterated its commitment to peace and development for all Bangsamoro areas, even for those who are no longer within its jurisdiction and measures are in place to transition BARMM staff currently assigned to Sulu.

Politics and Identity: Sulu and Mindanao

The reassignment touches deep cultural and historical roots in the region. Sulu has long maintained a distinct identity, historically centered on the Sultanate of Sulu—a maritime polity that predates Spanish colonization and governed parts of what is now the southern Philippines.

The Tausug people, who form the majority in Sulu, trace their heritage to this sultanate, with traditions shaped by Islam, seafaring trade, and strong local leadership structures that evolved independently of both colonial Manila and mainland Mindanao.

The Tausug people evolved independently of both colonial Manila and mainland Mindanao.

Ethnolinguistic groups dominant in the BARMM such as the Maguindanaon and Maranao were organized around inland sultanates like those of Maguindanao and Lanao with different customs and systems of governance.

These differences have also shaped political identities. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which emerged in the early 1970s and drew much of its support from Sulu and other western Mindanao areas, pursued Moro self-determination through a secular, nationalist lens. In contrast, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), based primarily in central Mindanao, broke away to develop a movement grounded in Islamic political principles. Today, it is the MILF that leads the BARMM government, having been the Philippine government's key partner in the peace process.

The MNLF drew much of its support from Sulu and other western Mindanao areas, pursuing Moro self-determination through a secular, nationalist lens.

This has led to concerns, especially in Sulu, that the BARMM’s structure and leadership reflect the priorities of a Maguindanaon elite. With many top positions in the Bangsamoro Transition Authority occupied by individuals close to the MILF’s central leadership—largely from central Mindanao—some Tausugs feel that their voices and cultural perspectives are underrepresented.

Many top positions in the Bangsamoro Transition Authority are occupied by individuals close to the MILF’s central leadership.

A Future in Region IX

Now under Region IX, Sulu finds itself aligned with a predominantly Christian administrative area centered on Zamboanga.

Questions remain about whether the province’s needs—rooted in a predominantly Muslim and island-based context—will be fully understood or addressed under a new regional leadership.

While a part of BARMM, Sulu benefited from a guaranteed annual block grant from the national government—a special fiscal arrangement mandated by the Bangsamoro Organic Law to support the autonomous region’s development. That funding mechanism provided the BARMM with a predictable and sizable share of national resources, insulated from annual political bargaining in Congress.

Now that Sulu is under Region IX, it will revert to the standard national budgeting process, where allocations are subject to legislative approval and competition with other provinces. This is especially pressing given Sulu’s geographic isolation and history of underdevelopment. Sulu leaders have previously been in discussion the House of Representative to discuss the Sulu’s future without the fiscal guarantees and political leverage afforded by the BARMM.

Sulu will revert to the standard national budgeting process, where allocations are subject to legislative approval and competition with other provinces.

A Victory for Self-Determination

For many in Sulu, the larger question remains unanswered: how to secure meaningful representation, resources, and development in a country where regional governance remains uneven. While Executive Order No. 91 could be seen as a technical matter, it also affirms the result of a local plebiscite and the principle of self-determination.

Yet the future remains uncertain, and it is still unclear whether this new political alignment will effectively support Sulu’s cultural identity, governance, and economic development in the long run.

This ongoing regional arrangement quietly contrasts with more vocal claims related to the historical territories of the Sulu Sultanate—such as the Sabah dispute—which often divert international headlines from the immediate and pressing concerns of the Tausug people.

The Sabah dispute often diverts international headlines from the immediate and pressing concerns of the Tausug people.

While the Philippine government has distanced itself from the high-profile legal campaign over the Malaysian state, attention to such disputes has captured international headlines. Yet for many residents of Sulu, the more pressing concern lies not across the sea, but at home—where basic questions of governance, identity, and development remain unresolved.

REFERENCES

Bacelonia, W. (2024, September 11). SC: Sulu not part of BARMM due to 2019 plebiscite result. Philippine News Agency. https://www.pna.gov.ph/

Inquirer.net. (2025, August 1). Sulu province now under Zamboanga region. Ihttps://newsinfo.inquirer.net/

MindaNews. (2025, August 2). BARMM to Sulu: ‘Our doors will never close’. MindaNews. https://mindanews.com/top-stories/

Nazario, D. (2024, September 16). Tolentino raises concern over Sulu’s fiscal problem after exclusion from BARMM. Manila Bulletin. https://mb.com.ph/

Philippine News Agency. (2024, November 27). SC: Sulu exit from BARMM final, executory. Philippine News Agency. Retrieved May 30, 2025, from https://www.pna.gov.ph/

The Mindanao Sentinel. (2024, September). Sulu leaders meet with House of Representatives to address implications of Sulu’s exclusion from BARMM. The Mindanao Sentinel. https://themindanaosentinel.com/