Then–Vice Mayor Sara Duterte and self-proclaimed Sultan Fuad Kiram attend the 2nd Mindanao MNLF Leadership Peace Summit in Davao City (May 2008). MNLF founder Nur Misuari, strategically placed between his political allies, was on stage at the time. Image Source: “The Royal Hashemite Sultanate of Sulu and Sabah” (Facebook).

One was then–Vice Mayor Sara Duterte, daughter of future President Rodrigo Duterte. The other: Fuad Abdulla Kiram, a self-proclaimed Sultan of Sulu and Sabah. Between them sat an empty chair, reserved for MNLF founder Nur Misuari, who was on stage at the time.

The absence was telling: even off-camera, Misuari’s symbolic centrality served a purpose, allowing Duterte and Kiram to visibly anchor themselves to militant power, a calculated proximity that projected validation without accountability. Flanked by MNLF elite, the image captured more than an alliance of convenience; it revealed the calculated convergence of political heirs, paramilitary networks, and ceremonial displays that would shape their subsequent careers. Rather than reducing them to mere caricatures, their parallel ascent highlights systemic flaws in Philippine politics, where authority emerges from militant influence and reciprocal validation.

Amid this choreographed convergence, the stakes are rapidly escalating. As of August 6, 2025, the Senate has archived the impeachment complaint against Sara Duterte, following the Supreme Court’s decision declaring it unconstitutional. This effectively halts formal proceedings in Congress for the time being. The archiving does not equate to dismissal, but it forestalls accountability and places increased importance on judicial review and public pressure. Sara Duterte’s legal team shifted their focus to the Supreme Court in defense of the decision, while the Senate formally confirmed it would no longer proceed with the case. This pause in accountability raises urgent questions about executive impunity and institutional erosion at a critical political juncture.

Meanwhile, Duterte’s political trajectory remains dangerously unmoored, intensifying calls for scrutiny. With Sara Duterte maneuvering past impeachment toward a potential presidential run and Fuad Kiram persisting in his destabilizing Sabah sovereignty campaign, their overlapping strategies now carry urgent implications for both domestic governance and regional stability.

Duterte’s political trajectory remains dangerously unmoored.

Warlord Diplomacy

Militant alliances were foundational for both Sara Duterte and Fuad Kiram’s rise. As mayor and vice mayor of Davao, Sara operated in the environment her father, Rodrigo Duterte, crafted, one where collaboration with groups like the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) ensured local control and influence.

Rodrigo Duterte’s protection of MNLF founder Nur Misuari following the 2013 Zamboanga siege, an event that killed over 200 people, displaced 100,000, and wounded hundreds, demonstrated this alignment. Duterte’s warlord diplomacy allowed the rising political star to consolidate control by forging personalist alliances with armed actors, including the notorious Misuari. Despite the evidence mounted against Misuari, Duterte defended his strategic ally as a “revolutionary figure,” even facilitating Misuari’s temporary release, claiming, “We have a historical obligation to him.”

President Rodrigo Duterte shares a friendly embrace with longtime ally and MNLF founder Nur Misuari during a high-profile 2017 meeting. Image source: Ace Morandante

Sara Duterte, who rose from vice mayor to mayor of Davao City in 2010, remained silent during this crisis. This silence suggested not just passivity, but an intentional positioning aligned with militant actors central to her father’s governing strategy. Her non-response during the siege mirrored her silence during the peak of Davao’s death squad operations, reinforcing her quiet assent to violent methods of control. As vice president, this pattern persisted, evidenced by live-streamed threats toward political opponents and controversial confidential fund allocations.

Duterte’s response during the siege mirrored her silence during the peak of Davao’s death squad operations, reinforcing her quiet assent to violent methods of control.

Like the Dutertes, Fuad Kiram adopted strategic engagement with militants, notably with Nur Misuari himself. Kiram condemned Misuari’s earlier house arrest and again criticized his post-siege detention, aligning with Rodrigo Duterte’s rhetoric. At the 2008 MNLF Peace Summit in Davao City, Kiram and Misuari showcased their alliance by mutually enforcing Kiram’s narrative and denouncing Malaysia’s control of Sabah. According to Kiram’s Royal Sulu website, Misuari proclaimed, “the end of landgrabbing and illegal occupation of Sabah by Malaysia,” asserting that “Sabah is not owned by Malaysia, but by the people of the Sultanate of Sulu.” Misuari then prompted the audience, “If Malaysia does not return Sabah, what are we to do?” The site claims the crowd responded, “We will fight and we will go to war!” Misuari then reportedly clarified, “We will make peace, but if we are provoked, we have the right to self-defense”—a veiled threat. At that same Davao summit, in which Sara Duterte willingly participated, Kiram called for vigilance, resilience, and rapid expansion—urging MNLF loyalists to grow their numbers to 300,000 within a year. It was the same coercive strategy that would come to define the Duterte era.

… “If we are provoked, we have the right to self-defense”—a veiled threat.

MNLF founder Nur Misuari and self-proclaimed Sultan Fuad Kiram present a united front at the 2nd Mindanao MNLF Leadership Peace Summit (2008). Image Source: “The Royal Hashemite Sultanate of Sulu and Sabah” (Facebook).

Internationally, this convergence has drawn concern. Rodrigo Duterte remains under ICC investigation for crimes against humanity related to the Davao death squads. Legal observers argue Sara Duterte could be scrutinized next, especially if the ICC expands its scope to include local officials who facilitated or remained complicit. The international community’s response underscores a troubling disparity between global standards of accountability and their domestic grounding in the Philippines. Yet, all three actors, Kiram, Rodrigo, and Sara Duterte, engaged in a form of strongman-style ‘Big Stick Diplomacy,’ treating militant affiliations as instruments of deterrence and dominance. By mixing ceremonial honors, overt alliances, and calculated silence, they cultivated political loyalty through fear and flattery.

All three actors, Kiram, Rodrigo, and Sara Duterte, engaged in a form of strongman-style ‘Big Stick Diplomacy,’ treating militant affiliations as instruments of deterrence and dominance.

Fuad Kiram poses with senior MNLF commanders following the 2008 summit. Image Source: “The Royal Hashemite Sultanate of Sulu and Sabah” (Facebook).

Kiram institutionalized this approach by embedding MNLF leaders into his “Royal Hashemite Sultanate of Sulu and Sabah” (RHSSS) network. Misuari, revered within the MNLF and commanding a cult-like following, strategically received royal honors such as Royal Datu and Knight of multiple invented RHSSS orders. Zain Jali, known for publicly acknowledging the MNLF’s ransom operations, was named Head of Treasury and Charity. Habib Nikabulin, former commanding general of the Mindanao Composite Task Force Command, was appointed “Minister of Home Affairs” and “Chairman of the Sharif Council on Royal Affairs.” These appointments converted militant notoriety into perceived authority, allowing Kiram to borrow their popular appeal to strengthen his ceremonial state.

Left (Captioned by the RHSSS Facebook): “Baron Gen. Nikabulin Kassim Andah (MNLF Chief Inspector General and Sultanate Chief of Staff), HM Sultan Muhammad Fuad Abdulla Kiram I, HRH Prince Omar Kiram Dux de Legazpi Duque de Vivar-Maniquiz (Grand Prince & Prince Marshal), and Count Sharif Gen. Habib Adz Ganih Nikabulin (Sultanate Home Minister and Minister for Sharifs Affairs, and commanding general of MNLF Mindanao Composite Taskforce Command, as well as MNLF political emissary pose for historic photograph.” Right: An RHSSS award provided to General Nikabulin, MNLF Chief Inspector. Image Source: “The Royal Hashemite Sultanate of Sulu and Sabah” (Facebook).

Dynastic Reciprocity

Beyond militant alignment, Duterte also endorsed Kiram’s ceremonial monarchy directly. Founded by Fuad Kiram in 2006, the Royal Hashemite Sultanate of Sulu and Sabah (RHSSS) relies on historical revisionism, contrived royal decrees, and symbolic appointments to substantiate Kiram’s contested claim to Sabah. Although the RHSSS invokes a lineage dating back to 1457, with a claim that the royal order was officially established in 1658, it significantly diverges from the authentic, Tausug-rooted Sultanate of Sulu and functions largely to propagate fictitious narratives about sovereign entitlement.

At the RHSSS–CMDM forum in July 2010, Fuad Kiram poses beside his close advisor ‘Prince Omar’ Kiram (as labeled on the plaque), while Sara Duterte smiles from the center back. Image Source: “The Royal Hashemite Sultanate of Sulu and Sabah” (Facebook).

In 2010, Sara Duterte attended a forum co-hosted by Kiram’s RHSSS and the ambiguous “CMDM”—possibly the Council of Maharlikan Descendants of Mindanao, another fringe group known for distributing feigned titles, or alternatively the Christian Muslim Democrats (CMD), a political group occasionally misidentified with the same acronym. Regardless of the CMDM’s identity, the event’s organizers, chiefly the RHSSS, used the occasion to elevate Kiram’s status through awards and honorary titles to those that would fuel his propaganda and popularity. Duterte’s visible presence at such a nonessential event signaled more than diplomatic curiosity; it reflected informed support for Kiram’s invented regime and its broader narrative campaign. Coming just two years after their joint appearance at the MNLF summit fueled with militant rhetoric, it further demonstrated a pattern of tacit endorsement from Duterte. The event, disguised as a civic forum, was a carefully curated display to reaffirm Kiram’s sovereignty, with Sara Duterte's knowing support.

Duterte’s visible presence at such a nonessential event signaled more than diplomatic curiosity; it reflected informed support for Kiram’s invented regime and its broader narrative campaign.

Several forum attendees receive Royal Orders from the RHSSS. Most notably, at center in a suit jacket, is Pedro Briones—advisor to Kiram’s self-styled sultanate. Image Source: “The Royal Hashemite Sultanate of Sulu and Sabah” (Facebook).

This support was not limited to ceremonial appearances. The Duterte family’s position on Sabah has consistently aligned with Kiram’s. Rodrigo Duterte, during his presidential campaign in 2016, pledged to pursue the Philippine claim over Sabah “to the last day of my term,” invoking historical rights of the Sultanate of Sulu. He stated, “We have a claim. That is why I will not close it.” Duterte’s support of the Philippine claim provided indirect legitimacy to all Kiram factions, including Fuad. Multiple reports indicate that the Duterte government facilitated meetings with Kiram family members regarding the Sabah claim, reinforcing the administration's alignment with their cause. Sara Duterte echoed similar sentiments as Davao City mayor, publicly describing the Sabah issue as “a matter of national interest.”

Through calculated dynastic endorsement of each other’s contentious agendas, the Dutertes helped transform fringe territorial assertions into central issues of national policy, giving undue visibility and political weight to otherwise marginal claims.

Through calculated dynastic endorsement of each other’s contentious agendas, the Dutertes helped transform fringe territorial assertions into central issues of national policy.

Host Fuad Kiram delivers a speech honoring guests, while Sara Duterte (left) sits at the head table among key figures in attendance. Image Source: “The Royal Hashemite Sultanate of Sulu and Sabah” (Facebook).

The Decline of Democratic Accountability

This narrative is not unique to the Philippines but reflects a broader trend in global politics, where populist leaders increasingly fuse militant allegiances, outrageous antics, and authoritarian methods to validate their power. Both Duterte and Kiram participate in destabilization of the region - Kiram through a sprawling international legal farce over Sabah, disrupting ASEAN unity as well as drawing international condemnation, and Duterte through policies and alliances undermining quintessential democratic accountability.

These practices suggest troubling trends in contemporary governance, particularly within Southeast Asia, where the lines between recognized authority and paramilitary power are increasingly blurred. As impeachment controversies and international legal disputes unfold, Filipinos and the broader international community must critically examine the underlying structures that enable such manipulations to infiltrate and manipulate democratic institutions.

REFERENCES

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Self-made Sultan, Fuad Kiram, with his spurious coat of arms. Image Source: “The Royal Hashemite Sultanate of Sulu and Sabah” (Facebook).