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From Westminster to Offshore Arbitration: Mapping the TPLF Ecosystem

From Westminster to Offshore Arbitration: Mapping the TPLF Ecosystem

Debates in the House of Lords juxtapose the public principles of litigation funding with the opaque realities of an industry with far reaching influence and consequences beyond British jurisdictions. Image Source: House of Lords

In April 2024, Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom addressed the House of Lords in defense of third party litigation funding (TPLF). On the surface, everything appeared orderly, even virtuous.

He argued that such funding can be essential, allowing individuals without means to challenge powerful actors and pursue accountability where it might otherwise be denied. Without financial backing, he warned, legitimate claims wither and misconduct escapes scrutiny.

Yet beyond Westminster, away from the official record and public broadcast, a darker narrative has been taking shape. It does not so much contradict these arguments as cast a long shadow over the incentives and practices that have come to plague the TPLF industry.

“Albert Arbuthnott is not related to Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom, but the contrast is nonetheless striking”

One way this parallel can be scrutinized is through the firm of the coincidentally similarly named Albert Michael Arbuthnott, also of British peerage. UK corporate records show that he is a director of Hanuman Partners Limited, a company reported to be actively fronting the Sulu arbitration on behalf of one of the most prominent names in the TPLF industry, Therium.

Albert Arbuthnott is not related to Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom, but the contrast is nonetheless striking: while litigation funding is defended in Parliament as a principled tool of access to justice, its most aggressive applications unfold far from public scrutiny, through opaque structures and private intelligence operators.

The Company Arbuthnott Keeps

The Sulu arbitration was brought by individuals claiming to represent the heirs of the former Sultanate of Sulu against Malaysia, seeking nearly $15 billion based on colonial-era claims to the Malaysian state of Sabah—or its economic value. It has been described as one of the most aggressive litigation funding plays of the modern era.

On December 9th, 2025, the effort suffered a decisive setback when the case’s remaining arbitration avenues were exhausted, effectively bringing the formal legal process to an end. Despite that outcome, according to Intelligence Online, Therium is seeking ways to continue the dispute beyond the arbitration. Those efforts are said to be led by Charles Webb, the founder of Hanuman Partners, situating Arbuthnott within a firm now associated with sustaining pressure through other means.

“Therium is reported to be seeking ways to continue the dispute beyond arbitration, with the founder of Arbuthnott’s firm, Charles Webb, fronting efforts.”

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Webb himself is a long-standing figure in the private intelligence industry associated with sensitive international disputes. Hanuman Partners describes itself as a strategic advisory firm, yet critics portray it as operating in the murkier space where dispute strategy, influence analysis, and information campaigns intersect. These activities rarely appear in court filings but can shape the terrain on which legal battles are fought. It is these very activities that Therium is suspected of bankrolling in order to perpetuate the Sulu dispute.

Even before the unsurprising defeat of the Sulu arbitration was announced in December 2025, the Sulu claimants and their legal counsel were suspected of scheming a continuation strategy. As informed by KnowSulu, members of the claimants’ legal team, including lead counsel Paul Cohen, met with individuals described as private intelligence or strategic advisers, including Webb in Manila.

The timing and setting was unlikely to be coincidental. The Sulu claimants’ team may be exploring options to involve the Philippine government now that arbitral avenues have been exhausted. Previous media comments on government involvement made by the Sulu claimants’ legal team in November 2024 have even included China, all in an effort to pressure Malaysia into a financial settlement that might recoup the significant sums Therium stands to lose in the case. Indeed, only last year Therium rebranded itself as an advisory rather than a direct litigation funder, following difficulties in turning a profit from aggressive, high-risk cases such as the Sulu arbitration.

“Therium has rebranded itself as an advisory rather than a direct litigation funder following struggles to turn a profit from its aggressive and failed funding of high-risk cases like the Sulu arbitration.”

Funding Access, Regulatory Gaps

The significance of these events lies in its implication. If intelligence and influence planning were discussed alongside legal tactics, it would suggest that the Sulu claim was advanced through a coordinated strategy blending law, capital, and information operations. Such activities are notoriously difficult to document precisely, owing to the unregulated opacity of the TPLF ecosystem.

Even now, Therium and the Sulu claimants’ lawyers face an unlawful means conspiracy lawsuit in Jersey, in the Channel Islands, where they are suspected of channeling funds connected to the arbitration and its surrounding activities. As such, even as litigation funding is defended in Parliament as a pillar of access to justice, even as some of its most aggressive applications rely on intelligence consultancies, influence strategies, and opaque financial structures operating beyond public oversight

The focus inevitably returns to London, where Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom defended litigation funding and pushed back against efforts to restrict TPLF following the PACCAR ruling—reflecting a parliamentary concern, often reasonably held, that excessive limits on funding risk denying claimants access to justice.

There is no evidence of coordination between parliamentary advocacy and private advisory activity. The issue instead is one of transparency and emphasis. While parliamentary debate has tended to prioritize access to capital for litigation, far less urgency has been directed toward the safeguards, disclosure requirements, and oversight mechanisms needed to keep pace with an industry that now operates across legal, financial, and even private intelligence domains. As cases like Sulu illustrate, the challenge is not simply whether claims can be funded, but whether the structures that fund them are subject to sufficient scrutiny to ensure confidence in the integrity of the system itself.

“While parliamentary debate has tended to prioritize access to capital for litigation, far less urgency has been directed toward the safeguards, disclosure requirements, and oversight mechanisms needed to keep pace with an industry that now operates across legal, financial, and even private intelligence domains.”

Concerns were not absent from the very debate in which litigation funding was defended. It was acknowledged that historic prohibitions on practices such as champerty arose from fears that investors would effectively bet on and exploit lawsuits for profit. It was also noted that modern funders face few limits on the share of recoveries they can claim, and no clear obligation to operate transparently.

Ultimately, there is a striking contrast between the clean halls and measured debates of Parliament, where TPLF is discussed in principle, and the grey, opaque work being funded beyond public scrutiny. As the industry expands across legal, financial, and influence-driven domains, the more pressing question becomes whether the transparency, safeguards, and oversight governing litigation funding have kept pace. Without greater urgency on disclosure and accountability, confidence in the impartiality of the justice system risks being shaped not by the merits of claims alone, but by the opacity of the structures and financial interests that stand behind them.

REFERENCES

Intelligence Online. (2026, January 14). Hanuman Partners, Erys, Control Risks, Salveo, Putala Strategies. https://www.intelligenceonline.com

KnowSulu. (2026, January 2). Jersey’s hidden conspiracies: From Russian billions to the Sulu arbitration. https://knowsulu.ph

KnowSulu. (2025, October 16). Plotting a “lease of Sabah”? The Sulu heirs’ China gambit. https://knowsulu.ph

KnowSulu. (2025, July 18). Therium’s gamble: How big money still breeds big losses in litigation funding. https://knowsulu.ph

Taddia, M. (2025, October 6). Therium shifts focus with new litigation finance advisory. Law360. https://www.law360.com

UK Parliament. (2024, April 15). Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) Bill [HL]. Hansard. https://hansard.parliament.uk

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