Stilt houses of the Bajau Laut along Sabah’s coast—home to generations of sea nomads—now face growing pressure from evictions and enforcement crackdowns. Like other migrant communities, the Bajau Laut have become collateral damage in the fallout from the Sulu claimants’ arbitration, as migrant communities are increasingly viewed through a lens of suspicion and security. Image Source: iStock

Filed by eight private Filipino citizens claiming to be heirs to the former Sultanate, the lawsuit rests on the argument that Sabah does not rightfully belong in Malaysia, raising serious legal and political implications for Sabahans and migrants alike.

Beyond a private suit to claim billions in assets, what is at stake are human connections between Sabah and the southern Philippines that stretch back centuries, rooted in economic necessity and social continuity rather than territorial dispute.

Beyond a private suit to claim billions in assets, what is at stake are human connections between Sabah and the southern Philippines that stretch back centuries.

Today, of Sabah’s approximately 3.4 million residents, around 1 million are undocumented migrants or stateless individuals who are integral to sectors such as agriculture, fisheries, plantations, construction, hospitality, and domestic work.

Among these communities, the Tausūg—known locally as Suluk—originally from the southern Philippines and the majority ethnicity of Sulu, are estimated at around 300,000 in Sabah. While some Tausūg are documented, many others remain undocumented or stateless, with limited access to education, healthcare, legal protections, or consular services.

Efforts to normalize and integrate communities

Historically, progress has been made to support the historical migrant labor ecosystem despite the raising of modern borders after the end of Europe’s colonial empires. The Philippine Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW) system—dating back to the 1970s with institutional anchoring in the 1982 establishment of the POEA and the 1995 Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act—maintains channels for legal migration and migrant protection.

Despite rising hostility, Malaysia has also continued some efforts to normalize the status of Sabah’s migrants, introducing in 2024 the Sabah Workers Integrated Management System (SWIMS), which introduced biometric identification and QR codes for formalizing workers in plantations and construction.

The Lahad Datu incursion and resurfaced claims

Yet despite these programs, the environment for migrants in Sabah is growing increasingly hostile after the 2013 Lahad Datu incursion, where armed men linked to the Sulu Sultanate triggered a deadly standoff that left dozens dead. The event deeply unsettled public confidence, fusing long-standing migration issues with fears of infiltration and separatist agendas. It resulted in expanded security zones and a marked shift in public sentiment toward suspicion of Filipino migrants and migrants in general.

The Lahad Datu Incident deeply unsettled public confidence, fusing long-standing migration issues with fears of infiltration and separatist agendas.

Any hopes for a rapid healing process after the incursion were dashed when eight private citizens from the Philippines—claiming to be heirs of the Sulu Sultanate—launched a multibillion-dollar arbitration case against Malaysia five years later. For many in Malaysia, the lawsuit revived anxieties about sovereignty, infiltration, and historical claims that were once seen as settled by Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

While Manila has worked to maintain cooperation with Malaysia on migration and border management, the Philippine government has historically also had an ambiguous stance on the claims of the supposed Sulu heirs— ranging from dismissive to entertaining Filipino claims to Sabah. Although a minority, recent nationalistic voices in the Philippines have also called for the assertion of such claims, gradually escalating caustic discourse into a threat to Malaysian sovereignty.

The Philippine government has historically also had an ambiguous stance on the claims of the supposed Sulu heirs— ranging from dismissive to entertaining claims to Sabah

Combined with domestic pressure, these fringe narratives have made Kuala Lumpur cautious of partnerships with governments claiming Malaysian populations and territories, and reluctant to make any move that might appear to legitimize the Sulu claimants.

This unease became particularly palpable in early 2024 when Malaysian authorities identified 538 squatter colonies sheltering over 140,000 undocumented migrants—including approximately 90,000 Filipinos. Around the same time, some 500 stateless Bajau Laut (sea nomads) were evicted from stilt-house settlements in a widely publicized operation, and as many as 45,000 detained since 2020.

These actions are backed by public sentiment: a 2023 Ipsos survey found that 72% of Malaysians supported barring refugees from entering the country, and 52% favored deporting those already present. Meanwhile, 62% viewed refugees as having a negative impact, with many linking migration to economic strain, disease, and violence.

72% of Malaysians supported barring refugees from entering the country, and 52% favored deporting those already present.

Is there hope?

As the Paris Court of Appeal deliberates over the summer on a final decision over the monetary interests of the Sulu claimants, events of the last decade have already hardened public attitudes toward migrant communities and their cross border ties. These tensions have only been further stressed by a wider refugee crisis in Southeast Asia stemming from conflict, economic hardship, and the Covid pandemic.

Events of the last decade have already hardened public attitudes toward migrant communities and their cross border ties.

Amidst these challenges and the prospect of paying the Sulu claimants billions in the aftermath of the 2013 incursion, Malaysia’s political leaders often have little choice but to appear tough on migration and tougher still on threats to sovereignty and security.

Nonetheless, a dismissal of the case would likely relieve pressure on the Philippine and Malaysian governments, which must both walk a delicate line between domestic political sensitivities and its foreign relations.

This could create a modest but meaningful window for both governments to re-engage on practical migration issues—such as documentation, protection, and social services—potentially improving conditions for the hundreds of thousands of migrants and stateless individuals in Sabah who are caught in the wake of the Sulu claimants’ lawsuit.

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