Bangsamoro Parliament. Image Source: Bangsamoro Information Office

As BARMM prepares for its first parliamentary elections on October 13, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) is renewing efforts to bring Sulu back into the fold. Their campaign follows the 2024 Supreme Court ruling that officially removed Sulu from BARMM—a legal outcome stemming from the province's 2019 plebiscite vote against inclusion. While that decision marked a win for certain provincial leaders, the aftermath has exposed unresolved governance challenges and deepened isolation.

To the MNLF, Sulu’s exclusion is more than a technical matter; it is a symbolic rupture in the Moro struggle. “Sulu is an integral component of the collective aspiration of the Moro people in Southern Philippines for progress and peace via self‑governance,” declared MNLF Central Committee Chair Muslimin Sema in Patikul. He added, “Sulu is the virtual birthplace of the Moro uprising for self-rule... Now Sulu... was taken out from the Bangsamoro region.”

Yet the timing of the MNLF’s appeal also reflects a strategic effort to reassert its relevance. With BARMM now firmly under the influence of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the MNLF's influence has waned. Regaining Sulu—its historical base—would allow the group to re-enter the political arena and reclaim a seat at the table.

The timing of the MNLF’s appeal also reflects a strategic effort to reassert its relevance.

The Pros and Cons of Reintegration

Reintegration offers the MNLF and many Tausugs a pathway to restore political influence and participate in BARMM-administered development programs. Since the Supreme Court ruling, Sulu has lost its parliamentary representation and influence over regional initiatives such as the Asian Development Bank’s $400 million Blue Economy program—while provinces within BARMM benefit from targeted investments.

Some national support has reached Sulu. In June 2025, the Department of Social Welfare and Development disbursed ₱20.6 million in aid to 458 former MNLF fighters. These benefits—covering food, health insurance, and documentation—highlight a disparity: while former combatants are integrated into structured reintegration programs, Tausug civilians who never took up arms receive minimal support. As one community leader asked following the Supreme Court ruling: “We were told we won, but what did we win?”

MNLF leaders frame reintegration as a way to reaffirm historical unity and rebalance power in a region increasingly dominated by the MILF. For everyday Tausugs, it could mean improved infrastructure, better access to services, and a stronger voice in regional policymaking.

On the other hand, continued exclusion preserves Sulu’s autonomy and identity outside a political system that some view as MILF-controlled. Without guarantees of fair representation, local leaders worry that reintegration could become merely symbolic—offering little in terms of real power or tailored governance. Many agree the issue is not reintegration itself, but the terms under which it might occur.

Ultimately, the question is whether reintegration can deliver measurable improvements in governance, equity, and quality of life for Tausugs—who, so far, have seen little reward for their province’s legal victory.

The question is whether reintegration can deliver measurable improvements in governance, equity, and quality of life for Tausugs

Can Reintegration Still Happen?

The Commission on Elections has confirmed that mock polls will take place on July 25 in select areas, including Tawi‑Tawi and Lanao del Sur, to test ballots and prepare systems ahead of the official elections. With ballot printing already underway, Comelec has emphasized that any last-minute changes to seat distribution—such as those involving Sulu—must be resolved immediately to avoid complications. This underscores the tightening window for reintegration before polls open and adds urgency to legislative or executive decisions on the issue.

Concerns over exclusion intensified in early July 2025 when BARMM’s legislature approved a bill to redistribute Sulu’s seven parliamentary seats to other regions, including Basilan, Cotabato City, and the Special Geographic Area. The October elections will proceed with 73 of 80 seats contested; Sulu’s former seats will remain vacant unless reactivated through new legislation or presidential action.

The redistribution cements Sulu’s current status outside the BARMM political framework and suggests reintegration before the 2025 elections is unlikely. Post-election, however, new negotiations could open the door—provided they address representation, accountability, and equitable development.

Sulu’s former seats will remain vacant unless reactivated through new legislation or presidential action.

What Comes Next for Sulu?

The MNLF presents reintegration as a return to historical unity—but the political dynamics are more complex. Without genuine grassroots inclusion, reintegration could deepen skepticism and entrench elite control. However, if approached with equitable representation and clear development commitments, it might rebuild confidence and renew Sulu’s engagement.

With the redistribution of Sulu’s seats and the BARMM elections looming, the practical window for reintegration before the polls is closing. Any post-election shift would likely require presidential intervention or new legislation—underscoring the scale of the political effort required. The broader question is whether Sulu’s future lies in continued separation or in forging a reintegration deal that delivers tangible gains to its people.

REFERENCES

Inquirer. (2025, June 1). Lawmakers fixing adverse effects of Sulu’s separation from BARMM. Philippine Daily Inquirer. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/

Malaya Business Insight. (2025, July 10). BARMM mock polls set on July 25. https://malaya.com.ph/news/national-news/barmm-mock-polls-set-on-july-25/

MindaNews. (2025, July). 458 MNLF members in Sulu receive ₱20.61 million assistance from DSWD. MindaNews. https://mindanews.com/

Sarmiento, B. (2025, July 16). BARMM bodies okay bill redistributing Parliament seats meant for Sulu. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/

Sarmiento, B. (2025, July 15). BARMM legislature panels approve redistribution of 32 district seats. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/

Solaiman, T. (2025, July 6). Comelec: 73 parliament seats to be contested in BARMM polls. https://www.inquirer.net/

Unson, J. (2025, June 5). MNLF wants return of Sulu to BARMM’s territory. The Philippine Star. https://www.philstar.com/

Villanueva, M. (2025, June 17). BARMM election should push through. The Manila Times. https://www.manilatimes.net/

Yusingco, M. (2021). Deliberate Democracy and the Bangsamoro Parliament. SSRN. https://papers.ssrn.com/