An armed security personnel patrols in the southern Philippines, where weak governance and contested authority have created fertile ground for ongoing extremist influence. Image Source: AFP

Chief among these actors is the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), but Dawlah Islamiyah, the Maute Group, and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF)—primarily active in mainland Mindanao but ideologically aligned with groups operating in the Sulu Archipelago—also contribute, alongside foreign-aligned jihadist cells and local extremist factions. These actors exploit weak governance and lingering tensions to maintain influence, despite a decline in large-scale attacks. Their continued presence—marked by piracy, kidnappings, and local violence—sustains a fragile security environment. This threat is particularly urgent as the region approaches the Bangsamoro provincial and municipal elections on May 12, 2025, and the parliamentary elections on October 13, 2025—two key transitions that extremist networks may seek to exploit.

Extremist Groups’ Enduring Threat

The Abu Sayyaf Group, designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, and the European Union, among others, has sustained a campaign of violence for over three decades. Notable incidents include the 2004 SuperFerry 14 bombing, which killed more than 100 people, and the 2016 Davao City night market attack. The group has also frequently targeted civilian infrastructure to maximize public fear.

Other violent actors, such as Dawlah Islamiyah and remnants of the Maute Group—both of which pledged allegiance to ISIS—have also capitalized on the region’s instability. These groups have collaborated with or mimicked ASG’s tactics, drawing from the same pool of community dissatisfaction: poverty, marginalization, and ineffective governance.

Despite sustained military pressure that has disrupted many strongholds, these extremist groups persist in remote, poorly governed regions. There, they exploit local economies, kinship ties, and communal discontent. Their continued threat not only disrupts peacebuilding but also undermines the perceived legitimacy of other actors in the region. Groups like the Sultanate of Sulu—already weakened by internal divisions and controversial actions—suffer reputational damage as they are conflated with, or seen as complicit in, the instability that extremist networks exploit. This dual dynamic complicates both domestic and international perceptions of who holds moral or political authority in the region.

Fragmented Authority and Rising Recruitment

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), leading the Bangsamoro Transition Authority, has struggled to fully assert governance across all areas of the autonomous region. Incomplete reforms and limited territorial control have created opportunities for extremist actors to assert influence. Similarly, the Sultanate of Sulu has deepened instability through internal fragmentation, politically charged maneuvers, and an absence of credible leadership. Together, these parallel failures—one rooted in formal governance and the other in traditional authority—have enabled extremist groups to entrench themselves.

As noted by the International Crisis Group (2024), “the MILF-led interim government faces the dual challenge of delivering basic services and maintaining security in areas where its authority is contested.” This governance gap—encompassing inadequate service delivery, weak law enforcement, and limited political representation—provides extremist actors space to assert influence, especially in areas already unsettled by the Sultanate of Sulu’s incendiary claims and polarizing rhetoric. These gaps—whether in service delivery or symbolic leadership—deepen instability and provide extremist groups with opportunities to fill the void.

Such conditions create fertile ground for extremist recruitment, particularly as the Sultanate of Sulu contributes to the region's instability. A prominent and timely example is the Sultanate’s revocation of its 1962 Sabah sovereignty transfer in March 2025, reigniting territorial disputes, straining Philippine-Malaysian relations, and fueling nationalist sentiment. This political maneuver is part of a broader pattern of behavior that accelerates local instability and radical sentiment.

Such conditions create fertile ground for extremist recruitment, particularly as the Sultanate of Sulu contributes to the region's instability.

The Sultanate has allowed competing factions to lay claim to the throne, fueling internal divisions and eroding its own legitimacy. It has also called for foreign intervention and initiated legal challenges against Malaysia, straining diplomatic ties and undermining ASEAN unity. Additionally, inflammatory rhetoric and narratives of marginalization have further alienated local populations from state institutions. According to the International Crisis Group, “the Bangsamoro peace process, while successful in many respects, is hitting obstacles at a critical moment,” as delays in normalization and disarmament risk disillusioning former combatants and residents alike. This frustration overlaps with the Sultanate’s antagonistic behavior, deepening distrust and opening space for extremist messaging.

The situation is further intensified by the lead-up to the Bangsamoro provincial and municipal elections scheduled for May 12, 2025. These elections represent a critical milestone in the region’s transition from armed insurgency to autonomous governance. However, this period of change heightens uncertainty. Extremist groups are likely to seize on anxieties, fractured loyalties, and persistent governance gaps to expand their influence. In regions where the MILF-led government struggles administratively and the Sultanate’s activities have already eroded public trust, heightening the risk that elections may serve as a flashpoint for instability.

Failed Leadership and Extremist Opportunity

Crucially, the Sultanate has failed to provide meaningful leadership or development in its claimed territories. Its symbolic power—once rooted in cultural relevance—now often appears driven by self-interest and financial motives. This absence of effective leadership allows extremist groups to step in, often portraying themselves as protectors or providers in places where traditional institutions fail.

In the absence of a credible presence, groups like ASG and Dawlah Islamiyah present themselves as defenders of local identity and security. Disillusioned by broken promises and frustrated by marginalization, local communities—particularly youth—become increasingly susceptible to extremist narratives.

The Sultanate’s revived claim over Sabah complicates diplomatic negotiations and undermines regional peace efforts, while also deepening domestic instability.

A 2024 study by The Asia Foundation observes that extremist groups in the region thrive on youth disenfranchisement and distrust of formal institutions. These actors weaponize nationalist and religious narratives to validate their missions. “Political instability significantly increases extremist mobilization, as unresolved grievances provide a continuous source of ideological ammunition,” according to a 2023 analysis by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. The study emphasizes that fragile governance and unaddressed social needs create conditions ripe for extremist appeal. The U.S. State Department (2021) similarly reports a correlation between local insecurity and higher rates of terrorist recruitment.

By aligning themselves with deep-rooted discontent—while filling a governance void with militant alternatives—extremist groups transform discontent into ideological and operational strength. For instance, ASG’s exploitation of maritime insecurity and BIFF’s opportunistic recruitment in post-conflict zones underscore how specific groups leverage weak authority to bolster their presence. These examples underscore how institutional breakdowns and symbolic leadership failures together enable extremist entrenchment.

Blurred Lines: Extremism and the Sultanate of Sulu

Although groups like ASG, Dawlah Islamiyah, and the Sultanate of Sulu are distinct entities, their geographic proximity and overlapping grievances often blur lines in public perception. This conflation lends unintended legitimacy to extremist actors, as discourse links them to the same destabilizing environment.

The Sultanate’s revived claim over Sabah complicates diplomatic negotiations and undermines regional peace efforts, while also deepening domestic instability. By reigniting long-standing territorial tensions, the claim amplifies nationalist rhetoric and heightens local grievances—conditions that extremist groups exploit to recruit and radicalize individuals who feel politically disenfranchised or alienated. While no formal alliances exist, the perception of proximity—both physical and ideological—damages the Sultanate’s credibility and further entangles it in the region’s extremist landscape.

Toward Stability

The southern Philippines remains a complex and fragile region shaped by colonial legacies, governance gaps, and identity-based politics. Extremist groups exploit these fractures, adapting to shifting dynamics while sustaining violence and radicalization. Lasting solutions must address root causes: poor governance, unresolved territorial claims, lack of economic opportunity, and exclusionary leadership.

If left unaddressed, political stagnation and unfulfilled promises will continue to empower extremist actors who capitalize on the very instability others ignore.

REFERENCES

Crisis Group. (2024). Southern Philippines: Making Peace Stick in the Bangsamoro. International Crisis Group. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/331-southern-philippines-making-peace-stick-bangsamoro

Asia Foundation. (2024). Understanding violent extremism messaging and recruitment on social media in the Philippines. The Asia Foundation. https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Understanding-Violent-Extremism-Messaging-and-Recruitment-on-Social-Media-in-the-Philippines.pdf

Echeminada, P. (2025, March 24). Sultanate of Sulu declares revocation of Sabah sovereignty transfer to PH. Daily Tribune. https://tribune.net.ph/2025/03/24/sultanate-of-sulu-declares-revocation-of-sabah-sovereignty-transfer-to-ph

Hoffman, B. (2023). Decapitation, retaliation, and the indicators of escalation in Mindanao. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. https://icct.nl/sites/default/files/2023-11/Decapitation%2C%20Retaliation%2C%20and%20the%20Indicators%20of%20Escalation%20in%20Mindanao.pdf

National Counterterrorism Center. (n.d.). Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/abu_sayyaf.html

U.S. Department of State. (2021). Country Reports on Terrorism 2021: Philippines. https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2021/philippines/