U.S. Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, and Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary, Enrique Manalo, in Munich. Image source: U.S. State Department

As Sulu communities struggle to recover from devastating floods, they urgently need direct leadership and resources to rebuild. Yet, instead of prioritizing local rehabilitation, MSUM has chosen to invest its diplomatic capital and financial resources in courting U.S. attention—an effort that appears misaligned with the region’s most pressing needs.

Relying on a Historical Treaty

MSUM’s strategy hinges on historical agreements, particularly the Carpenter-Kiram Treaty of 1915. The Sultanate asserts that the 1915 agreement supersedes modern Philippine maritime laws as reported by The Tribune, with which MSUM spokesperson Abraham Idjirani frequently holds an audience. Idjirani further alleged that the Carpenter-Kiram Treaty should be the basis in defining the maritime territories of the Sultanate of Sulu.

However, legal scholars affirm the treaty is no longer valid. Dr. Geoffrey Marston, an international law expert and former professor at Cambridge University, notes that a treaty loses its operative validity when it has been superseded by subsequent treaties or rendered incompatible with fundamental changes in international law and the political status of involved territories. He further explains that colonial-era treaties like the Carpenter-Kiram Treaty lose legal weight once involved territories achieve full sovereignty, as the Philippines did post-World War II. Marston, who studied the Sabah dispute since the 1960s, had already determined that even then, the Sultanate of Sulu claims carried little legal significance.

Despite this, MSUM continues to invoke selective history to justify its claims, disregarding historical realities and the modern legal framework that defines international law.

The U.S.’ Strategic Interests

Beyond the legal shortcomings of MSUM’s claims, its diplomatic push fails to consider U.S. geopolitical priorities. The United States has long-standing alliances with the Philippines and Malaysia, prioritizing regional stability and security over historical territorial claims. The U.S. maintains extensive military, economic, and counterterrorism partnerships in the region, making support for MSUM’s claims highly unlikely.

The Philippine government has not supported the Sulu heirs in their ongoing territorial dispute, nor has it endorsed MSUM. As a result, the Sultanate of Sulu is increasingly isolated from Manila’s diplomatic and strategic priorities. This distinction was reinforced just weeks ago (February 2025) between Philippine Foreign Secretary Enrique Manalo and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the Munich Security Conference, an annual forum on international security issues. According to a readout provided by U.S. State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce, Rubio emphasized not only the U.S. commitment to the United States-Philippines alliance but also his enthusiasm for strengthening and expanding the relationship.

Further reinforcing Washington’s commitment to maintaining territorial stability, Rubio recently reiterated U.S. opposition to forced changes in established borders, particularly regarding China’s claims over Taiwan. This broader foreign policy doctrine—one that prioritizes territorial integrity and existing alliances over historical disputes—makes it even less likely that the U.S. would entertain MSUM’s claims, which do not align with American strategic interests in the region.

Given Washington’s deepening ties with Manila, there is little incentive for the U.S. to jeopardize its alliance by supporting a movement that even the Philippine government does not endorse.

MSUM’s diplomatic appeal is further weakened by its demand for U.S. reparations, a request that stands in stark contrast to modern and historical practices. The United States has consistently declined large-scale reparations, even in response to well-documented systemic injustices against Native Americans and African Americans. Despite decades of advocacy and legislative initiatives, the U.S. government has remained unwavering in its refusal to authorize reparations for historical wrongdoings. Given this firm stance, it is highly improbable that the U.S. would support MSUM’s tenuous $25 billion claim against Malaysia, a longstanding American ally, especially when its historical and legal foundations remain debatable. Moreover, endorsing MSUM’s petition could reignite U.S. domestic debates on reparations, introducing unintended political consequences that Washington has historically sought to avoid.

Given Washington’s deepening ties with Manila, there is little incentive for the U.S. to jeopardize its alliance by supporting a movement that even the Philippine government does not endorse.

MSUM’s Troubled Track Record

MSUM’s diplomatic efforts are further undermined by internal inconsistencies and credibility concerns. Abraham Idjirani, MSUM’s representative, previously served as the voice of the armed faction involved in the Lahad Datu incursion of 2013, an event internationally condemned and linked to extremist activities. Such associations significantly diminish MSUM’s legitimacy making diplomatic overtures less palatable to U.S. policymakers cautious about engaging with groups potentially tied to terrorism.

Additionally, MSUM’s recent actions have exposed troubling organizational weaknesses. With Sultan Phugdalun Kiram II declaring himself the self-imposed leader of MSUM, the movement and the Sultanate have effectively merged, consolidating power at the top. This unification solidifies a centralized, authoritative structure, raising concerns about whether the perspectives and concerns of the broader Sulu populace will be meaningfully considered or overshadowed by a single ruling figure.

The consequences of this consolidation have already begun to manifest in MSUM’s diplomatic efforts. Reports allege that initial contact was made with the U.S. State Department over a week ago, though details remain ambiguous. Moreover, the Sultan’s emissary claimed to have secured a meeting with the U.S. State Department on March 3, 2025, seeking support for $25 billion in reparations from Malaysia. “The emissary is scheduled to meet U.S. State Department officials next Monday for a possible audience with Secretary Rubio to seek U.S. endorsement of the [UN] petition,” Idjirani told The Tribune. However, conflicting reports from The Tribune made just three days later (March 6), now suggest that the meeting will happen at the beginning of April—after Ramadan—as the emissary was actually in Saudi Arabia at that time. Whether this breakdown in communication is the result of internal mismanagement or a diplomatic rebuff by U.S. authorities—neither strengthens MSUM’s and the Sultanate’s credibility.

Misplaced Priorities

Beyond diplomatic failures, the strategy of MSUM, and by default, the leadership of the Sultanate, poses risks for the Sulu region. By inserting itself into geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and China, the Sultanate risks diminishing regional autonomy, deepening economic dependency, or becoming a mere pawn in global power struggles. Given these stakes, diverting resources from urgent local needs—such as flood recovery and infrastructure—represents a significant miscalculation.

MSUM’s current diplomatic approach is impractical and counterproductive. By prioritizing ill-conceived foreign overtures over urgent domestic concerns, the movement risks undermining its legitimacy while neglecting the very communities it claims to represent.

REFERENCES:

De Santos, J. (2025, February 22). Manalo, Rubio discuss ‘more invested and enduring relationship’ in Munich meet. ABS-CBN News. https://www.abs-cbn.com/news/nation/2025/2/15/manalo-us-counterpart-discuss-more-invested-and-enduring-relationship-in-munich-meet-0936

Echiminada, P. (2025, March 1). MSUM: Philippine maritime laws contradict Carpenter-Kiram Treaty of 1915. Daily Tribune. https://tribune.net.ph/2025/03/01/msum-philippine-maritime-laws-contradict-carpenter-kiram-treaty-of-1915

Echiminada, P. (2025, March 6). Sultanate emissary to visit US State Department after Ramadan. Daily Tribune. https://tribune.net.ph/2025/03/06/sultanate-emissary-to-visit-us-state-department-after-ramadan

Echiminada, P. (2025, February 26). Sultanate of Sulu makes contact with US Department of State. Daily Tribune. https://tribune.net.ph/2025/02/26/sultanate-of-sulu-makes-contact-with-us-department-of-state

Echiminada, P. (2025, February 27). Sulu Sultanate invokes 1915 treaty. Daily Tribune. https://tribune.net.ph/2025/02/27/sulu-sultanate-invokes-1915-treaty

Everington, K. (February 27, 2025). Rubio says US opposes Chinese force or coercion to change Taiwan's status. Taiwan News. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/6047138

Know Sulu. (2025, February 7). History Repeats Itself: A Dangerous Bid for U.S. Support. Retrieved from https://knowsulu.ph/the-untold-sulu-story/history-repeats-itself-a-dangerous-bid-for-u-s-support

Marston, G. (1970). International Law and The Sabah Dispute. Australian Yearbook of International Law, 3. https://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AUYrBkIntLaw/1970/4.pdf

Marston, G. (1971). International Law and The Sabah Dispute: A Postscript. Australian Yearbook of International Law, 8. https://www4.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AUYrBkIntLaw/1971/8.pdf

Tzanakopoulos, A. & Tams, C. J. (2019). The Settlement of International Disputes: Current Problems in International Law. https://brill.com/display/book/edcoll/9789004386242/BP000108.xml