Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) Headquarters. Image Source: File Photo BARMM

After the Supreme Court ruling in late 2024 affirmed that Sulu is not part of the BARMM—owing to its rejection of the 2019 Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) plebiscite—Sulus, including the UTC, are no longer eligible to participate in BARMM’s electoral processes. This ruling not only upheld Sulu's initial rejection but also redefined its legal and administrative boundaries outside of the Bangsamoro region. Compounding the issue, the Department of Justice clarified last week that the Sultanate has no legal authority to appoint BARMM officials, formally ending any lingering claims to political influence within the autonomous region.

Strategic Missteps Lead to Isolation

A pattern of politically shortsighted decisions led to this marginalization. By encouraging opposition to the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) and rejecting BARMM’s legitimacy, Sulu leadership believed they were protecting a form of sovereignty and identity. In practice, however, they only succeeded in excluding themselves from the institutions that could have provided representation and influence. Their legal efforts—such as challenging the constitutionality of Sulu’s inclusion in BARMM—eventually succeeded, but at the cost of cutting off any future participation in BARMM’s political and administrative processes. Following the Supreme Court decision, BARMM officials have begun redistributing Sulu’s seven parliamentary seats to other areas in the region. These districts had previously represented Sulu in the Bangsamoro Parliament, but will now be reassigned to ensure equitable representation for areas still within BARMM ahead of its first regional elections in October 2025.

On the international stage, the situation was compounded by a series of uncoordinated and divisive sovereignty claims—most notably over Sabah. Rather than engaging through diplomatic channels or aligning with Philippine foreign policy, UTC-aligned and Sultanate-associated actors pushed their (similar, yet distinct) claims in a unilateral and provocative manner. This alienated key ASEAN partners, particularly Malaysia, and raised concerns among international observers. Such moves not only lacked broad regional support but signaled a disregard for multilateral diplomacy. As a result, international institutions have increasingly viewed the Sultanate’s traditional leadership as politically outdated, erratic, and diplomatically isolated.

The legacy of the 2013 Lahad Datu incursion in Sabah has further damaged the Sultanate’s political position. The incursion—led by armed followers of self-proclaimed Sultan Jamalul Kiram III and closely associated with the Kiram family network, including figures like Fuad Kiram—resulted in dozens of deaths and a prolonged security crisis. Malaysia has since designated Fuad Kiram, one of several claimants to the Sultanate’s throne, as a terrorist, and the incident remains a stain on the Sultanate’s global reputation. Instead of generating political power and international sympathy for the Sabah claim, the incursion was widely condemned and reinforced perceptions that elements of the Sultanate leadership are willing to resort to militancy to pursue political goals. This association with violent tactics has made it nearly impossible for the Sultanate to earn legitimacy in international forums.

Governor Abdusakur Tan II, a prominent Tausug politician and former gubernatorial candidate for BARMM leadership, is now barred from participating in BARMM’s electoral system due to Sulu’s exclusion. This reflects the broader political shutdown for all Sulu-based actors seeking regional representation. The cumulative effect of domestic legal miscalculations, divisive sovereignty posturing, and reputational damage tied to past violence has left the UTC and the ex-Sultanate politically sidelined—both at home and abroad.

International institutions have increasingly viewed the Sultanate’s traditional leadership as politically outdated, erratic, and diplomatically isolated.

Reframing the Future: Realistic Paths Forward

Despite this widespread isolation, there remain realistic paths for the Sulus to regain political relevance—if their leadership is willing to embrace a more pragmatic and unified approach.

Their first step must be re-engagement with the national government. With Sulu no longer part of the BARMM, political leverage must now be built through direct partnerships with departments in Manila. This includes securing development funding, pushing for inclusion in national peacebuilding strategies, and establishing collaborative programs in coordination with agencies such as the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), and the National Commission on Muslim Filipinos (NCMF). By demonstrating administrative capability and responsiveness to public needs, the Sulus can begin to restore their credibility with national policymakers and more importantly, within their own community.

Additionally, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is currently considering reassigning Sulu to the Zamboanga Peninsula region (Region IX), returning it to its former administrative grouping prior to the formation of BARMM. While largely administrative, this reassignment does not reverse Sulu’s political isolation. It merely shifts its bureaucratic oversight and has no bearing on its loss of regional influence.

Looking ahead, Sulu’s participation in the national and local elections set for May 12, 2025, offers one of the few remaining avenues for legitimate political expression. Provincial leaders have publicly vowed to ensure peaceful elections—a sharp departure from past associations with armed conflict and sovereignty standoffs. If honored, this commitment to nonviolence could help rehabilitate Sulu’s credibility both nationally and within its own communities. By showing that its leadership is capable of constructive, democratic governance, the region may begin to regain the political trust it has lost.

At the provincial level, their leaders must turn their focus toward effective local governance. This means moving away from symbolic leadership and focusing instead on the practical needs of their constituents. Delivering visible improvements in education, health services, transportation infrastructure, and livelihood development is essential. Projects that bring tangible benefits to Tausug communities—such as rural clinics, literacy drives, or microenterprise support—can reestablish trust and prove that current leaders are capable of more than ceremonial roles. There have been many claims for money, power, and prestige - but very little hands-on action for their people.

There have been many claims for money, power, and prestige - but very little hands-on action for their people.

Another key strategy involves investing in cultural preservation and regional identity. The Sultanate still holds significant cultural capital, particularly within the broader Islamic and maritime heritage of Southeast Asia. By repositioning themselves as stewards of Tausug culture rather than claimants of political sovereignty, the Sulus can lead a heritage revival that unites communities rather than divides them. This could take the form of establishing a Sulu Heritage Institute, launching interfaith education initiatives, or organizing cultural diplomacy exchanges with Indonesia, Brunei, and Malaysia. Such efforts may also attract support from international organizations like UNESCO or the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), providing cultural recognition even where political recognition is lacking. With the many years some Sultanate leaders have spent damaging the reputation of the region, it’s time to put the people above their own self-interests.

Furthermore, with BARMM no longer an avenue for influence, the Sulus could benefit from building new regional alliances. Cooperation with neighboring provinces—particularly on shared concerns like maritime security, fisheries, and transportation—could form the basis for a coalition with greater political influence. Regional collaboration might not carry the prestige of BARMM representation, but it could offer practical gains and renewed political relevance in areas where Sulu’s strategic importance remains strong.

None of these efforts, however, will succeed without first addressing the deep divisions within the leadership and community itself. The fragmentation among competing Sultanate claimants continues to undermine their political effectiveness. Until a mechanism is developed to resolve succession disputes and present a united leadership, the Sulus will remain vulnerable to internal rivalry and external dismissal. Unity, not nostalgia or unilateralism, must be the foundation of any credible political future.

A Call for Reinvention

Sulu's exclusion from BARMM, while a significant political defeat largely of its own making, also offers a rare chance for reinvention. This juncture demands a departure from nostalgia and reactionary stances toward a more deliberate and forward-looking political recalibration.

The Sultanate’s unilateral stance on contested issues such as Sabah sovereignty—lacking broad domestic or international support—has only deepened the region’s diplomatic isolation. These moves, made without strategic alignment, have marginalized Sulu within ASEAN dialogue and undermined its credibility abroad.

With its former seven parliamentary seats in BARMM already reassigned, Sulu’s prospects of reintegration into the autonomous region are virtually nonexistent, barring an improbable reversal of legal precedent and political momentum.

Faced with this political reality, the former Sultanate must now channel its efforts into community development, inter-provincial collaboration, and institutional reform. Doing so offers the most credible pathway to renewed influence.

The path forward is stark: persist in clinging to symbolic power rooted in a fractured past, or forge a new relevance through unity, pragmatism, and tangible public service.

REFERENCES

BusinessMirror. (2025, April 7). Sultanate of Sulu not allowed to appoint BARMM officials. https://businessmirror.com.ph/2025/04/07/sultanate-of-sulu-not-allowed-to-appoint-barmm-officials/

Gita-Carlos, R. (2024, September 9). SC: Sulu not part of BARMM due to 2019 plebiscite results. Philippine News Agency. https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1247576

Jalil, A. (2013, March 1). Malaysia security forces face off with armed Filipinos in Sabah standoff. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/01/malaysia-sabah-standoff-filipino-gunmen

Palatino, M. (2023, October 10). The fading legitimacy of the Sulu Sultanate’s Sabah claim. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/the-fading-legitimacy-of-the-sulu-sultanates-sabah-claim/

Ramirez, R. (2023, July 25). Who speaks for Sulu? The crisis of identity and leadership in the southern Philippines. Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. https://pcij.org/article/10347/sulu-leadership-identity-crisis

Torres-Tupas, T. (2025, April 9). Transfer of 7 Sulu BARMM parliamentary districts to other areas mulled. Philstar Global. https://www.philstar.com/nation/2025/04/09/2434729/transfer-7-sulu-barmm-parliamentary-districts-other-areas-mulled