In the Philippines, guns, guerrillas and government have long been intertwined. Image Source: Reuters

It has deep historical roots in colonial legacies, agrarian struggles, and long-standing grievances in Mindanao, while also manifesting in modern forms such as jihadist militancy, clan feuds, and communist insurgency.

Yet extremism does not only appear in the mountains or rebel-held strongholds, it also emerges in Manila’s halls of power, where populist presidents and entrenched dynasties have embraced divisive rhetoric, normalized violence, and rewritten history for political gain. To understand extremism in the Philippines today requires examining how these currents, insurgent and elite, local and national, interact with one another and shape the country’s political trajectory.

Historical Roots

The origins of extremism in the Philippines are inseparable from the country’s colonial past. During the Spanish and American periods, vast inequalities in land ownership and centralized governance produced long-term grievances among the rural poor. Filipinos also directly experienced forms of political extremism under colonial rule and foreign occupation, including repression during Spanish rule, militarized governance under the Americans, and brutal violence during World War II. These episodes ingrained a sense that politics and survival were often mediated through extreme measures, making later generations a product of that history.

It was those conditions that fueled the Hukbalahap rebellion of the 1940s and 1950s, a communist-led peasant uprising in central Luzon driven by poverty, displacement, and postwar uncertainty. President Ramon Magsaysay eventually quelled the movement through a mix of military reforms, amnesty, and rural development. He became best known for successfully defeating the Hukbalahap, according to contemporaneous accounts, and his campaign is still remembered as one of the rare cases where force was tempered with meaningful reform. This episode, however, also signaled how violence became normalized as a state strategy from its onset, setting a precedent that political crises could be solved through coercion as much as reform, and laying an early foundation for extremism to be seen as part of the Philippine political landscape.

Violence became normalized as a state strategy from its onset, setting a precedent that political crises could be solved through coercion as much as reform, and laying an early foundation for extremism.

In Mindanao, the story unfolded differently. Muslim-majority communities that had long resisted colonial encroachment continued to fight for autonomy and recognition. The emergence of the Moro National Liberation Front in the 1970s and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the 1990s reflected decades of frustration with Manila’s neglect and domination. The granting of limited autonomy through the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in 1990 proved inadequate. Even President Benigno Aquino III would later acknowledge that ARMM had been a "failed experiment." Extremism had become woven into the Philippine political experience: for many Moros, confrontation with Manila became the norm rather than the exception, echoing a longer national history in which political demands were met with extremes of repression or rebellion. The peace process only regained momentum with the 2012 Framework Agreement and the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro, which paved the way for the establishment of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) in 2019.

Enduring Violence

Despite the formal peace process, extremist currents remain strong in 2025. Large-scale insurgencies have receded, but violent splinter groups persist. Factions of the Maute Group, Abu Sayyaf, and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters have maintained influence, often aligning themselves with transnational jihadist networks such as ISIS. The siege of Marawi in 2017 was the most dramatic reminder of this threat. Within just one month of fighting, more than 360,000 people were displaced, and the battle dragged on for five months before the city was retaken. Marawi became both a symbol of militant resilience and a lesson in the devastating costs of urban warfare.

Yet extremism in Mindanao cannot be reduced to jihadist cells alone. Clan feuds, or rido, are equally destabilizing. As one United States Institute of Peace report bluntly stated, “Clan feuds, or rido, are a constant threat to peace and stability across [BARMM].” These conflicts, often sparked by land disputes, political rivalries, or honor offenses, have killed thousands over decades. A seminal study documented more than 1,200 cases of rido between the 1930s and 2005, resulting in at least 5,500 deaths. Such feuds not only perpetuate cycles of revenge but also intersect with insurgency: militant groups recruit among aggrieved clans, and politicians exploit feuds to consolidate power. With BARMM’s first parliamentary elections scheduled for October 2025, the potential for rido-linked violence threatens to undermine the credibility of democratic transition. In preparation, the newly acting chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Lt. Gen. Jose Melencio Nartatez, has announced that 16,000 police officers will be deployed for the event.

“Clan feuds, or rido, are a constant threat to peace and stability across [BARMM].”

Meanwhile, the communist insurgency that once shook the Philippine state is a shadow of its former self. The Communist Party of the Philippines–New People’s Army (CPP–NPA) has lost much of its strength due to military pressure, defections, and waning rural support. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. declared in 2024 that “no guerrilla front remains active… only seven weak fronts to be dismantled.” However, this optimism is not universally shared, particularly due to recent violent outbursts. In late July 2025, firefights in Masbate and Northern Samar left several NPA rebels dead and revealed fortified hideouts equipped with landmines and high-powered weapons. The Armed Forces continues to estimate that fewer than 900 fighters remain, yet such encounters demonstrate that the insurgency retains operational capacity and the ability to inflict harm. Even if the NPA has become weakened, the threat of violence has been reduced but not eradicated.

Top-Down Extremism

Extremism in the Philippines, however, is not the exclusive domain of insurgents. National leaders have, at times, embraced politics that can themselves be described as extreme - marked by violent rhetoric, punitive policies, and systematic attacks on democratic norms.

Rodrigo Duterte’s presidency stands as a stark example. Between 2016 and 2022, his “war on drugs” claimed thousands of lives, with rights groups estimating widespread extrajudicial killings. Amnesty International concluded in 2017 that Duterte had “initiated a large-scale murdering enterprise” in the name of public safety. Duterte himself courted international outrage by declaring that he would be “happy to slaughter” millions of drug users, even likening himself to Hitler. Such language, combined with police operations that targeted the poor disproportionately, entrenched a culture of fear and division. Supporters hailed him as a strongman savior, while critics accused him of authoritarian excess.

“Hitler massacred three million Jews … there’s three million drug addicts. … I’d be happy to slaughter them. If Germany had Hitler, the Philippines would have …” (pointing to himself).

Ferdinand Marcos Jr., though less incendiary in tone, has governed in ways that also strain democratic norms. His presidency has leaned heavily on historical revisionism, seeking to rehabilitate the image of his father’s dictatorship while downplaying the well-documented abuses of martial law. The V-Dem Institute has reported that the Philippines under Duterte and Marcos has experienced one of the sharpest democratic declines in Asia, citing the erosion of press freedom and institutional checks. Freedom House, similarly, has downgraded the country to “Partly Free,” pointing to dynastic consolidation and lingering repression linked to the drug war.

What emerges is a troubling parallel. Just as insurgents use violence and propaganda to undermine state authority, national leaders have used populist rhetoric and authoritarian policies to corrode democratic life. Both normalize the idea that politics is a zero-sum contest where violence, intimidation, and distortion of truth are legitimate tools. In this sense, insurgent extremism and elite extremism do not simply coexist, they reinforce each other. Communities disillusioned by Manila’s heavy-handed governance are more susceptible to insurgent recruitment, while the persistence of armed groups provides populist leaders a pretext to expand coercive powers.

Both insurgents and politicians normalize the idea that politics is a zero-sum contest where violence, intimidation, and distortion of truth are legitimate tools.

What’s Working and What’s Stuck

Even amid this turbulent picture, important efforts are underway to stabilize the country. The establishment of BARMM remains the most significant peacebuilding achievement in decades. The upcoming parliamentary elections in October 2025 represent a critical test of whether this experiment in autonomy can deliver legitimacy. Yet controversies over Sulu’s exclusion from representation and ongoing disputes over parliamentary seats highlight the fragility of this process. Without credible elections, the promise of regional self-rule could falter before it matures.

The upcoming parliamentary elections in October 2025 represent a critical test of whether this experiment in autonomy can deliver legitimacy.

Demobilization of armed combatants offers another barometer of progress. By early 2025, approximately 26,100 former MILF fighters had surrendered their weapons—about two-thirds of the planned total. Each combatant received ₱100,000 in transitional cash assistance, and development programs were rolled out to support reintegration. While both praised for peacemaking and criticized as bribery, the process has nevertheless stalled. The final tranche of 14,000 fighters remains in limbo, with MILF leaders suspending decommissioning over unmet socioeconomic commitments and the government insisting it has delivered. Unless livelihoods, education, and infrastructure replace one-time payments, frustration could spill over into renewed militancy.

Unless livelihoods, education, and infrastructure replace one-time payments, frustration could spill over into renewed militancy.

Addressing rido is equally urgent. Research by groups such as International Alert and The Asia Foundation demonstrates that mediation, land titling, and swift compensation can prevent feuds from escalating into protracted wars. Yet these mechanisms remain unevenly applied, and as elections near, the risk of political manipulation looms.

At the counter-terrorism level, analysts stress the importance of distinguishing between insurgent movements with political grievances and small jihadist cells. Applying heavy-handed counterinsurgency tactics against communities at large risks alienating civilians and driving recruits into extremist ranks. A more targeted, intelligence-led approach can contain militant cells while preserving fragile trust in the peace process.

Reshaping the Future

Political extremism in the Philippines is a story of both rebellion and governance, insurgency and populism. Militant groups and clan feuds in Mindanao continue to challenge peace and development, even as communist insurgency has waned but not disappeared. At the same time, state-level extremism has eroded institutions and polarized society. Extremism, in short, is not confined to armed rebels; it also appears in the choices of national leaders.

The persistence of these patterns shows that peace cannot be reduced to disarming rebels alone. It also requires addressing authoritarian impulses in Manila, while ensuring that governance in the periphery delivers services, livelihoods, and opportunities. In many ways, extremism today represents a continuation of the Philippines’ violent past, now carried forward with new tools and political practices that risk shaping its future. Rebuilding trust between citizens and institutions is critical. Whether extremism continues to thrive, from jungle encampments to presidential palaces, will depend on whether the state can provide justice, accountability, inclusion, and a credible alternative to violence and division.

REFERENCES

Amnesty International. (2017). If you are poor, you are killed: Extrajudicial executions in the Philippines’ “war on drugs”. Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.org/

Calipay, C. (2025, July 27). 7 NPA rebels killed in Masbate clash. PNA. Philippine News Agency. https://www.pna.gov.ph/

Caliwan, C. L. (August 27, 2025). 16k cops to be deployed for Oct. 13 BARMM polls. Philippine News Agency. https://www.pna.gov.ph/

Freedom House. (2024). Freedom in the World 2024: Philippines. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/

Guardian staff. (2016, September 30). Philippines president Rodrigo Duterte likens himself to Hitler. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/

Inquirer.net. (2024, July 22). Only 7 weakened NPA guerrilla fronts remain, says Marcos. Philippine Daily Inquirer. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/

Meniano, S. (2025, July 31). Army slams NPA use of landmines in Northern Samar clash. Philippine News Agency.. https://www.pna.gov.ph/

PBS NewsHour. (2016, September 30). Philippines president compares himself to Hitler. PBS. https://www.pbs.org/

United States Institute of Peace. (2022, August 25). The importance of settling clan feuds for peace in the Philippines’ Bangsamoro region. USIP. https://www.usip.org/

V-Dem Institute. (2023). Democracy report 2023: Defiance in the face of autocratization. University of Gothenburg: V-Dem Institute.